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Abstract
Background: Many adverse events occur due to poor communication between surgical and anesthesia unit
personnel. The aim of this study was to identify strategies to reduce risks unveiled by a national survey on
patient safety.
Methods: During 2011–2015, specially trained survey teams visited the surgery departments at Swedish hospitals and
documented routines concerning safety in abdominal surgery. The reports from the first seventeen visits were
reviewed by an independent group in order to extract findings related to routines in communication between
anesthesia and surgical unit personnel.
Results: In general, routines regarding preoperative risk assessment were safe and well- coordinated. On the
other hand, routines regarding medication prior to surgery, reporting between the different units, and systems
for reporting and providing feedback on adverse events were poor or missing. Strategies with highest priority
include: 1. a uniform national health declaration form; 2. consistent use of admission notes; 3. systems for documenting
all important medical information, that is accessible to everyone; 4. a multidisciplinary forum for the evaluation of
high-risk patients; 5. weekly and daily scheduling of surgical programs; 6. application of the WHO check list; 7. open
dialog during surgery; 8. reporting based on SBAR; 9. oral and written reports from the surgeon to the postoperative
unit; and 10. combined mortality and morbidity conferences.
Conclusion: One repeatedly occurring hazard endangering patient safety was related to communication between
surgical and anesthesia unit personnel. Strategies to reduce this hazard are suggested, but further research is required
to test their effectiveness.
Background
Although surgical care has gradually become more
specialized, technically advanced, and focused on effi-
cacy, it has not eliminated adverse events due to hu-
man errors. In the United States, adverse events are
estimated to occur in 2.9 % to 3.7 % of all hospitali-
zations [1]. Surgery includes many hazardous proce-
dures where the risk of committing a mistake is high.
In Sweden, data from the Swedish Patient Insurance
(Landstingens Ömsesidiga Försäkringsbolag; LÖF)
show that in 2012, reported mistakes resulting in ad-
verse events increased by 7 % to 13 905 events, and
specialties such as general surgery and orthopaedics
accounted for the majority of mistakes.
Nagpal et al. analysed the entire surgical process from
pre-operative assessment to post-operative care and the
subsequent transfer to the wards [2]. Mistakes related to
communication were seen in pre-, peri- as well as post-
operative phases, but were the most common during
pre-operative assessment, in most cases because of for-
getfulness and ignorance, but also because of uncertainty* Correspondence: Gabriel.sandblom@ki.se
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in the distribution of responsibilities and the hier-
archy. Mistakes in the post-operative phase were also
common, including missing information and excess of
it. In interviews with the concerned staff, distracting
stimuli in the environment, lack of standardized com-
munication routines and primitive systems for ex-
change of information were identified as the main
causes of mistakes [3]. In another study, the quality
of reporting by anaesthesiologists was considered ad-
equate in only 32 % of the cases. Despite the fact that
in 96 % of the cases the patients handed over to
post-operative care were stable, nurses in the post-
operative unit were satisfied with the transfer reports
in only 48 % of the cases [4]. Greenberg et al. found
that most misunderstandings involved verbal commu-
nication between a single reporter and a recipient [5],
particularly if a surgeon was involved.
Many mistakes are also made in theatre. By trad-
ition, the staff working in theatre represents several
disciplines, which makes communication more com-
plicated [6]. Effective teamwork and communication
are crucial to safety in the operating theatre, but
communication is often complicated by differences in
professional practices across disciplines and the ways
in which professionals collaborate and may also be
impaired by differences in language, attitude, and the
level of education. Loyalty to the discipline may be
greater than that to the team and to the common
task at hand. Several studies have shown how the
difficulties that arise when information is perceived
differently by various members of the team cause
tension, conflicts, and practical problems. Social
barriers in the form of gender, ethnic background,
and socio-economic differences may add to the diver-
gent perception of information by different members
of a team [7].
The present study therefore sought to analyse the
reports from a national survey on patient safety to
find out the ten most frequent hazards related to
communications between anaesthetists and surgical
unit personnel and to assess possible strategies to re-
duce the risks from such miscommunication.
Methods
Survey organization
To survey the routine procedures followed in Swedish
surgical practice and to recommend any adaptations to
the routine suited to each individual unit, a nationwide
programme was started in 2011, titled Safe Abdominal
Surgery. The programme offered every surgical unit in
Sweden a visit by a survey team including 4–5 repre-
sentatives from surgery and anaesthesiology. The
programme focused exclusively on abdominal surgery;
vascular, urological, and gynaecological surgeries were
not included. The teams consisted of nurses and physi-
cians who had undergone specialized training.
Altogether 56 units in Sweden were invited to partici-
pate in the programme. By the end of 2015, 43 of them
will have been visited by a survey team. Written consent
was obtained from all participating units prior to the revi-
sion. To start with, the participating units were requested
to fill in a self-assessment instrument comprising 24 items
on measures considered important to preventing adverse
events in abdominal surgery (Fig. 1). The self-assessment
instrument is presented in Appendix 1.
Data on admissions at each unit during 2012 were ob-
tained from Statistics Sweden [8].
Following the self-assessment, each unit was visited by
a survey team consisting of 4–5 members, representing
both nurses and physicians from an independent unit,
who had attended a two-day training programme. The
training programme included an introduction in the
aims and methods of the survey. The self-assessments of
the units were also evaluated during the introduction.
The visits were based on interviews with personnel
from different categories, including representatives from
surgical and anaesthesiology units (residents and special-
ists in surgery and anaesthesiology). Nurses from the
outpatient clinic and surgical wards and anaesthesia and
surgery personnel from the operations room (OR) and
post-operative care facility were also interviewed about
the routines followed at their respective units. The head
of the surgical department was responsible for assem-
bling representatives from all personnel categories. Fur-
thermore, the survey teams were instructed to address
as many of the co-workers as possible in order to obtain
information from unprepared staff members.
The observations and outcomes of the interviews were
recorded in a standardized protocol based on the same
items as those presented in Appendix 1. The report spe-
cified a certain number of routines that needed improve-
ment at each unit.
Review of the revision reports
A preliminary retrospective review of the survey reports
pointed to a repeating pattern of problems in communi-
cation between the surgical staff and the personnel from
anaesthesia. To examine these observations more sys-
tematically, a group was commissioned by the Patient
Insurance LÖF [9] to evaluate the reports and to enu-
merate all the problems related to patient safety in the
routines involving communications between the surgical
staff and the personnel from anaesthesia. This group was
also multi-professional, comprising nurses and physi-
cians from surgical and anaesthesia units.
The present study is based on the observations and
conclusions from the survey teams. The reports com-
piled between 2011 and 2013 from 17 surgical units
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were reviewed, and the ten most frequent hazards re-
lated to communications between personnel of the
surgical and the anaesthesia units were selected for
retrospective evaluation. Each of these hazards was
subdivided into 1–6 issues, and safety systems and
routines at each of the units were assessed based on
these issues.
Adverse events were defined as unintended experiences
related to a surgical procedure. Risks were defined as po-
tential sources of adverse events that could have been
avoided by using better routines. Safety hazards were de-
fined as potential sources of all adverse events, both avoid-
able and unavoidable. Mistakes were defined as adverse
events due to inappropriate method of care and, therefore,
potentially preventable. As the survey did not involve any
new intervention or other interference with the health
care, no application to ethical committee was sent.
Data from the review reports
The reports were assessed using a predefined template
with the following questions. The questions were in
Swedish; an English translation is given here.
1. Is adequate documentation of the patient’s health
status obtained prior to surgery?
 Adequate health declaration form
 Consistent routines for filling in the health
declaration form
 System of patients’ records accessible to both
surgical and anaesthesia unit personnel
 Routines for documenting health status including
information on any communicable agents
requiring isolation
2. Routines for securing correct diagnosis and
intended procedure prior to surgery
 Adequate documentation
 Functioning health records system
3. Routines for securing pre-operative risk assessment
 Appropriate American Society of
Anesthesiologists (ASA) physical status
classification
 Documentation of ASA classification accessible to
everyone
 Forum for multidisciplinary evaluation of high-
risk patients
Aspects related to communication 
between surgery staff and  
anaesthesia staff evaluated in a 
retrospective review
External evaluation by revision team
Units included in Safe Abdominal  
Surgery 2011–2013 (N=17)
The review analysed to identify the  
ten most frequent issues  
Survey report according to 
predefined protocol
Internal evaluation based on 
predefined self-assessment 
instrument
Fig. 1 Flow chart of the revisions process and assessment of the outcome
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 Other risk assessment systems parallel to ASA
 Adequate documentation of all assessments
4. Is the patient’s status optimal prior to surgery?
 Routines to ensure that nothing is neglected
5. Is appropriate medication confirmed prior to
surgery and anaesthesia?
 Documentation available to anaesthesia as well as
surgical-unit personnel
6. Routines for clear peri-operative communication
 WHO checklist and/or any other system for crew
resource management used consistently and
correctly
7. Is peri- and post-operative pain management clearly
specified?
 Clear routines
 Documentation available to anaesthesia as well as
surgical-unit personnel
8. Is exchange of information ensured when patients
are transferred from post-operative unit and intensive
care unit?
 Clear and consistent routines defined
9. Is correct exchange of information ensured between
the medical units that a patient passes through
during in-patient treatment and the units responsible
for the patient after discharge?
 Documentation available to anaesthesia as well as
surgical-unit personnel
 Routines for documenting all measures taken
 Principles of situation background assessment
recommendation (SBAR) used consistently in
communication between different units
10.Are there routines for providing feedback on
adverse events or systematic safety problems that
could be improved?
 Mortality and morbidity conferences comprising
anaesthesia and surgical unit personnel
In the template, each of the issues listed under the






To account for inter-observer reliability, three ran-
domly selected reports were reviewed by two inde-
pendent reviewers and, based on these assessments,
intra-class correlation coefficients were estimated. In-
ternal consistency between different items for each re-
spective unit was estimated using Cronbach’s alpha.
Missing values were replaced with the means of each
unit. The number of adverse events reported to the
Swedish Patient Insurance as a percentage of total number
of admissions was tested for correlation against the mean
score to test whether the outcome of the revisions could
predict inadequate safety routines.
Results
The results of the 17 survey reports are shown in Fig. 2.
The units comprised six university hospitals, four re-
gional hospitals, and seven local hospitals. The median
number of admissions during 2012, including admission
that did not proceed to surgery, was 22 954 and ranged
from 5400 to 105 924. The median number of adverse
events reported to the Swedish Patient Insurance during
2007–2014 was 77 and ranged from 23 to 223. Data on
adverse events from 2015 are not yet available. The
median number of approved reports during the same
period was 25 and ranged from 6 to 89.
In general, the routine procedures related to pre-
operative risk assessment were safe and well-coordinated.
There were, however, some problems in the routines
followed during pre-operative medication and those that
involved reporting between different units and in the sys-
tems for reporting and providing feedback on adverse
events. Several survey reports did not provide reliable in-
formation on the discharge from post-operative care units
and intensive care units: communications between these
two units and the receiving units are therefore difficult to
evaluate.
In the review reports, a number of problems were
mentioned repeatedly (Table 1). Although it is impos-
sible to quantify these observations or to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the suggested measures to improve safety,
some patterns could be identified. The most frequently
recorded recommendations are listed in Table 1. The
WHO checklist was not used consistently at the units,
but it was not possible to determine which of the ele-
ments in the checklist were neglected.
Cronbach’s alpha for all items at the 17 units was
0.501, and the intra-class correlation coefficients for the
reports assessed by two independent observers are given
below.
Unit 1: 0.441 (95 % confidence interval 0.022–0.728,
p = 0.020)
Unit 2: 0.611 (95 % confidence interval 0.242–0.825,
p = 0.002)
Unit 3: 0.229 (95 % confidence interval −0.227–0.602,
p = 0.159)
Discussion
The nationwide survey showed that in Sweden, the rou-
tines for communication between the personnel of an-
aesthesia units and those of surgical units may involve
safety risks. Although efforts have been made in recent
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years to prevent mistakes in surgical procedures by de-
fining secure routines and by managing the different
teams better, many departments continue to lack proper
routines for preventing systematic and recurring hazards
due to poor communication between the personnel of
anaesthesia units and those of surgical units. The
recommendations in Table 1 may reduce the risk of ad-
verse events, although further studies are required to
prove that the recommendations are effective.
Routine procedures for risk assessment prior to surgery
were considered adequate in the majority of units. Precau-
tions to prevent post-operative pain were satisfactory;
Table 1 Most frequently reported safety hazards and recommendations to minimize their occurrence
Safety hazards Recommendations
Unreliable documentation of pre-operative health status • National uniform health declaration
• Standardized surgery notification form (Mandatory registration of the most important
data, consistent registration of contagious conditions, and preset limitations of care)
• Standardized routines for pre-operative assessment
• Routine use of ASA classification
• Selective pre-operative anaesthesiologist assessment based on ASA classification
(Patients with ASA I-II are assessed on request; those with ASA IV are assessed invariably.)
Divergent systems of documentation between different units • Consistent admission notes (structured with standard headings, preferably partly
delegated to a specialist nurse)
• Systems for documenting important medical information accessible to everyone
• Systems for patient records with a structure suitable for surgery as well as anaesthesia
Harmonization of management programmes of clinics involved in the same
course of care
• Coordinated and uniform systems for drug prescriptions for anaesthesia and surgery
Insufficient planning of high-risk procedures • Multidisciplinary forum for evaluation of high-risk patients
• Weekly scheduling of surgical programmes operations in the entire unit
• Daily scheduling of programmes in each theatre
Inconsistent use of checklists • Routine use of the WHO checklist
Lack of standardized communication • Open dialogue during surgery
• Team training with anaesthesia and surgery crew
• Reporting based on SBAR















Fig. 2 Assessment ratings from 17 survey reports. The figure shows the distributions of all subscales for each issue related to communications
between surgical personnel and anaesthesia personnel. Because data were missing for some subscales, the total does not add up to 100 % for
each scale. When the outcome was not assessable from the reports, the unit was excluded from the analysis
Göransson et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2016) 10:2 Page 5 of 8
however, the routines for communication between dif-
ferent departments needed improvement in most of the
hospitals. The survey reports did not provide enough
data to draw definite conclusions regarding the routines
for ensuring correct diagnoses and intended proce-
dures, proper medication and care prior to surgery,
peri-operative communication and feedback on adverse
events or systematic safety problems; when the reports
did provide enough data, the routines for peri-operative
medication and interdisciplinary conferences turned
out to be either poor or lacking altogether.
Most of the recommendations presented in Table 1
have been evaluated earlier and are now part of safety
improvement programmes in many hospitals. Some new
and untested routines were also encountered during the
review. However, because the main purpose of the study
was to identify safety hazards that could be avoided by
following well-established measures, only those rec-
ommendations that may gain general acceptance are
included. Although every survey team included repre-
sentatives from the fields of surgery and anaesthesia,
the mix of anaesthetic nurses, theatre nurses, sur-
geons, and anaesthesiologists varied from team to
team. Since the experiences of these professionals
from different fields may have been different, the sur-
vey report may also have been influenced by personal
views of the team members. Also, even if the stan-
dardized protocol was used by all the teams, it was
difficult to abstract all data in a uniform way. How-
ever, despite the uncertainties related to some issues
in the survey reports, the inter-observer reliability,
when reviewed retrospectively, was high.
The methods used in the present study were semi-
quantitative. The data were derived from a wide range of
Swedish surgical units and selection bias cannot be ruled
out. The programme was designed to survey Swedish
surgical health care in general, which makes it impos-
sible to assess the effectiveness of each of the strategies
presented above. Some of the suggested strategies have
been tested in larger studies [10, 11], but evidence-based
support for these is still very limited. Furthermore, des-
pite firm evidence, there may be reluctance to imple-
ment new routines [12]. There was no way of validating
the responses in the self-assessment instruments with
full security, but at the visits information interviews
were undertaken with as many of the staff members as
possible, including those were not prepared for the visits
in advance.
At the time of the analysis, less than a third of all
Swedish surgical units had had participated in the study.
More units have participated since. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the units that participated during the first
three years were those keener than the rest to bring
about improvements.
Checklists in medical practice may be an effective way
to ensure that no step in a surgical process is missed so
as to avoid adverse events that may occur when
personnel from two different units – surgery and anaes-
thesia, for example – are required to work together [13].
The SURPASS checklist accompanies the patient at each
stage of the surgical process [14] and is completed by
members of the team in the pre-operative ward, the op-
erating theatre, the post-operative unit, and the surgical
ward. Another way of improving the surgical process
and minimizing the risk of adverse events owing to
miscommunication between surgical personnel and
personnel of the anaesthesia unit is ERAS, the enhanced-
recovery-after-surgery programme. The programme was
designed to attenuate the stress response during surgery,
mainly by focusing on the need for parenteral analgesia
and intravenous fluids. It is based on a checklist and con-
tinuous feedback to all personnel on their performance.
Adopting the ERAS programme has lowered morbidity by
up to 50 % and shortened the surgery-related hospital stay
after major abdominal surgery by about 30 % [15–17].
The WHO checklist was created to improve safety in
the operating theatre. The purpose of the checklist is to
ensure that all conditions are optimal for patient safety
and that all the personnel present are identifiable and
accountable. The checklist includes 19 items divided
into three critical phases of the surgical procedure: be-
fore anaesthesia is induced, before the skin incision is
made, and before the patient leaves the operating the-
atre. The results of adopting the checklist have been
evaluated in large cohort studies [18, 19] and its use was
found to reduce the risk of serious adverse events con-
siderably. Another tool is the SBAR frame (short for
situation background assessment recommendation),
which is designed to elicit concise and focused informa-
tion using standardized questions, and can be applied in
any situation in which information about a patient is re-
quired to be communicated [20].
The present study was performed based on the as-
sumption that checklists improve surgical safety. Al-
though checklists have been reported to reduce
hazards [13, 19, 21], they have also been questioned
[22]. It is difficult to test safety routines because of
the Hawthorne effect, i.e. the very fact that their out-
come is going to be recorded may induce the inter-
vention group to perform better. If implemented
mechanically, checklists may create a false sense of
security and decrease alertness, which can help in
dealing with unforeseen hazards. The implementation
of checklists should thus be followed by a careful
evaluation of their impact on patient safety. The Safe
Abdominal Surgery programme, for example, will be
evaluated using data on adverse outcomes from gall-
stone, hernia, and colorectal cancer registries.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, this study shows that in Sweden, many
important potential hazards that endanger patient safety
in the surgical process are due to miscommunication or
poor communication between surgery personnel and
those involved in administering anaesthesia. There were
problems in the routines followed during pre-operative
medication and those that involved reporting between
different units and in the systems for reporting and pro-
viding feedback on adverse events. These problems may
be avoided by consistent use of admission notes, systems
for documenting all important medical information,
application of the WHO check list; reporting based
on SBAR oral and written reports from the surgeon
to the postoperative unit; and combined mortality and
morbidity conferences. The realization from the
present surveymay help to define strategies aimed at
reducing the risks from such hazards although further
research is required to test the effectiveness of such
strategies.
Appendix 1. Self-assessment instrument
A. Preoperative risk assessment
1. How do you ascertain that there is a correct
diagnose and that the right procedure is
planned?
2. How do you ascertain satisfactory preoperative
risk assessment and evaluation?
3. How do you ascertain an optimal planning prior
to surgery
4. How do you ascertain that all necessary
information regarding the health status of the
patient is assembled before the procedure?
5. How do you ascertain that the patient takes
active participation in all decisions and that the
patient has received all necessary information
before surgery?
6. How do you ascertain that the patient does not
carry multiresistant bacteria or other communicable
agents?
B. Procedures prior to anesthesia and surgery
1. How do you ascertain optimal circumstances
before surgery?
2. How do you ascertain adequate peri- and
postoperative analgesia
3. How do you ascertain that antibiotic prophylaxis,
thoroboprophylaxis and antiemetics are given
according to correct routines?
C. Anesthesia and surgery
1. How do you ascertain that the right patient
undergoes surgery and that the area of surgery is
correctly marked?
2. How do you ascertain that surgical competence
is available in case of difficutlies during the
procedure?
3. How do you survey and regulate vital functions
during the procedure?
4. How do you ascertain appropriate surgical
environment?
5. How do you ascertain access to surgical services
other than those routinely used?
D. Postoperative Intensive Care Unit and postoperative
care
1. How do you ascertain postoperative monitoring
and access to postoperative intensive care?
2. How do you ascertain appropriate discharge
from postoperative care unit?
3. How do you ascertain monitoring at the ward
after discharge from postoperative care unit?
E. Ward, discharge, and outpatient follow-up
1. How do you ascertain appropriate assessment at
discharge?
2. How do you ascertain that the patient has received
and understood all information at discharge?
3. How do you ascertain that postoperative
complications are managed adequately?
F. General aspects
1. How do you ascertain that basic sanitary routines,
including appropriate dressing, is followed during
the entire course?
2. What systems do you have for registering results,
adverse events and complications?
3. How do you ascertain correct exchange of
information between the units the patients pass
during and after the course of care?
4. How do you ascertain that all personnel has
appropriate knowledge about technical equipment?
5. Please give a short account of the profile of your
unit.
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